CULTURE MATTERS

CULTURE MATTERS

In the early 1990s, I happened to come across economic data on Ghana and South Korea in the early1 960s, and I was astonished steoe how similar their economies were then. These two countries had roughly comparablele vels of per capita GNP; similar divisions of their economy among primary products, manufacturing, and services; and overwhelmingly primary product exports,

with South Korea producing a few manufactured goods. Also, they were receiving comparable levels of economic aid. Thirty years later, South Korea had become an industrial giant with the fourteenth largest economy in the world, multinational corporations, major exports of automobiles, electronic equipment, and other sophisticated manufactures, and a per capita income

approximating that of Greece. Moreover, it was on its way to the consolidation of democratic institutions. No such changes had occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP was now about one-fifteenth that of South Korea’s. How could this extraordinary difference in development be explained? Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to me that culture had

to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline. Ghanaians haddifferent values. In short, cultures count. Other scholars were arriving at the same conclusions in the early 1990s.

This development was part of a major renewal of interest in culture among social scientists. In the 1940s and 1950s, much attention was paid to culture xiu Foreword as a crucial element in understanding societies, analyzing differences among

them, and explaining their economic and political development. Among the scholars involved were Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, David McClelland, Edward Banfield, Alex Inkeles, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, Lucian Pye,

and Seymour Martin Lipset. In the wake of the rich literature these scholars produced, work on culturein the academic community declined dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. Then, in the1 980s, interest in culture asa n explanatory

variable began to revive. The most prominent and most controversial early contribution to this revival was written by a former USAID official,

Lawrence Harrison, and was published by the Harvard Center for International Affairs in 1985. Entitled Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind-The Latin American Case, Harrison’s book used parallel case studies to demonstrate

that in most Latin American countries, culture had been a primary obstacle to development. Harrison’s analysis generated a storm of protest from economists, experts on Latin America, and intellectuals in Latin America. Inthe following years, however, people ianl l these groups began to see elements of validity in his argument. Increasingly social scientists turned to cultural factors to explain modernization,

political democratization, military strategy, the behavior of ethnic groups, and the alignments and antagonisms among countries. Most of the scholars represented in this book played major roles t hine renaissance of culture. Their successw as signaled by the emergence of a countermovement that pooh-poohed cultural interpretations, symbolically and visibly manifested in a highly skeptical December 1996 critique in the Economist of recent works by Francis Fukuyama, Lawrence Harrison, Robert Kaplan, Seymour MartinLipset, Robert Putnam, Thomas Sowell, and myself. In the scholarly world,

The battle has thus been joined by those who see culture as a major, but not the only, influence on social, political, and economic behavior and those who adhere to universal explanations, such as devotees of material self-interest

among economists, of “rational choice’’ among political scientists, and of neorealism among scholars of international relations. Indeed, the reader will find some of these views expressed in this book, which by design includes

dissent from the thesis captured in the title. Perhaps the wisest wordos n thep lace of culture in humana ffairs are those

of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it fromit self.” To explore the truth of Moynihan’s two truths, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies organized, under the direction of Lawrence Harrison, the

project of which this book is the principal but not the only product. To what extent do cultural factors shape economic and political developmentI? If they Foreword xu do, how can cultural obstacles to economic and political development be removed or changed so as to facilitate progress?

To wrestle with these questions effectively, it is first necessary to define our terms. By the term “human progress” in the subtitle of this book we mean movement toward economic development and material well-being, social conomic

equity, and political democracy. The term “culture,” of course, has  had multiple meanings in different disciplines and different contexts. It is often  used to refer to the intellectual, musical, artistic, and literary products of a society, its “high culture.” Anthropologists, perhaps most notably Clifford Geertz, have emphasized culture as “thick description” and used it to refer to

the entire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols, institutions, and human relationships. In this book, however, we are interested in how culture affects societal development;if culture includes everything, it explains

nothing. Hence we define culturei n purely subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society.

This book explores

Different Types of Loans

All loans, no matter what they are, are either secured or unsecured. Knowing the difference can better help you understand how they work and what to expect when applying for one.

Secured Loans

A secured loan is one that relies on an asset, such as a home or car, as collateral for the loan. In the event of loan default, the lender can take possession of the asset (foreclose on a home or repossess a car, for example) and sell it to recover the amount of money loaned. For this

reason, interest rates for secured loans are often lower than those for unsecured loans.

In many cases, such as in the purchase of a home, the asset to be used as the collateral will need to be appraised before the terms of the loan can be set.

Examples of secured loans are:

1. •        Car loans
2. •        Boat (and other recreational vehicle) loans
3. •        Mortgages
4. •        Construction loans
5. •        Home equity loans
6. •        Home equity lines of credit
7. ·        Unsecured Loans

Unsecured loans do not require the borrower to put forth an asset for collateral. The lender relies solely on the borrower’s credit history and income to qualify him for the loan. If the borrower defaults, the lender usually has to try to collect the unpaid balance through a variety of efforts which may include using collection agencies, freezing accounts, lawsuits, and garnishing wages. Because there is a considerably higher assumption of risk on the lender’s part with an unsecured loan, the interest rate is usually much higher.

They are often more difficult to obtain and the amounts loaned are usually lower than that for secured loans.

1. Examples of Unsecured Loans are:
2. •        Personal loans
3. •        Personal lines of credit
4. •        Student loans
5. •        Credit cards/department store cards
6. •        Payday Loans

Payday loans are relatively new on the loan scene. They are short-term loans borrowed using the borrower’s next paycheck as guarantee for the loan so, in a way, they are secured. However, payday loans have notoriously high annual percentage rates (APRs) and can be difficult to pay off. Banks do not generally offer Payday bloans. Most establishments offering them are private companies with separate storefronts.

Title Loans

A title loan, also fairly new, is a type of secured loan where the borrower can use

their vehicle title as collateral. Borrowers who get title loans must allow a lender to

place a lien on their car title, and temporarily surrender the hard copy of their vehicle title, in exchange for a loan amount. When the loan is repaid, the lien is removed and the car title is returned to its owner. If the borrower defaults on their payments then the lender can repossess the vehicle and sell it to repay the borrowers’ outstanding debt. Typically, the same companies that offer Payday loans will also offer title loans.

Student Loans

Student loans are, of course, used to get a person through college or other educational institution. There are many different types of student loans including:

•        Stafford loans, the most common federal education loans

•        students receive. They can be either subsidized or unsubsidized.

•        Perkins loans, low-interest federal loans, administered by the school, for students who demonstrate exceptional financial need.

•        PLUS loans, usually used to cover expenses not met by other federal

•        financial aid. These can be taken out by dependent students’ parents or by graduate students.

•        Institutional loans, non-federal aid that schools loan their students.

•        Private loans, usually sought by parents of students ineligible

for other aid or those who do not receive enough aid to cover the cost of attendance. In many cases, these must be secured by some form of collateral.

Mortgages

Mortgages are probably the most complicated types of loans and have the most variations, the first being who is underwriting or guaranteeing the loan. A mortgage loan might be any one of the following:

Conventional

Conventional loans are those that aren’t insured by a government agency like the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Rural Housing Service (RHS), or the Veterans Administration (VA). Conventional loans may be conforming, meaning they follow the guidelines set forth by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or non-conforming, meaning they don’t meet Fannie and

Freddie qualifications.

•        FHA Loans

FHA mortgage loans are insured by the government through mortgage insurance that is funded into the loan. First-time home buyers are ideal candidates for an FHA loan because the down payment requirements are minimal and the borrower’s FICO credit score does not affect the interest rate.

VA Loans

This type of government loan is available to veterans who have served in the U.S. Armed Services and, in certain cases, to spouses of deceased veterans. The main benefit to a VA loan is the borrower does not need a down payment. The loan is guaranteed by the Department of Veteran Affairs, but funded by a conventional lender.  Mortgage loans also vary greatly by repayment parameters. These days there are many options including:

Fixed-Rate Mortgages

A fixed-rate mortgage is one in which the interest rate on the note remains the same through the term of the loan. As a result, the payment amount and the duration of the loan are fixed. The borrower makes a consistent payment, usually monthly, for a specified number of years until

the loan is paid off. These payments are amortized, meaning that, as time goes by, more of each payment is applied to the principal than to interest.

The most common type of fixed-rate mortgages are 30 year and 15 year but other variations are also available. Adjustable-Rate Mortgages An adjustable-rate mortgage, commonly called an ARM, is one in which the interest rate fluctuates. It can move up or down monthly, semi-annually, or annually. In many types of ARM, the rate remains fixed for a period of time before it adjusts. For example, the rate on a 5-year ARM with a 30-year term will not be adjusted for the first five years.

With any ARM, it is important to note how frequently the interest rate can adjust, plus the index and the margin used to set the new interest rate. In other words, if it is tied to the prime rate and that rate jumps by 2 points in a year, the ARM rate could jump as well. However, there is often

a cap put on how much the rate can be raised in a single adjustment period.

Interest-Only Mortgage

Interest-only loans contain an option to make an interest-only payment. The option is available only for a certain period of time. However, some mortgages are indeed interest only and require a balloon payment, consisting of the original loan balance at maturity.

Balloon Mortgages

These mortgages are structured with a payment schedule similar to that of a thirty year fixed rate loan, although the term of the balloon loan is shorter, most often spanning five to seven years. At the end of the loan term, the outstanding balance must be paid in one lump sum, often by refinancing the home.

Reverse Mortgages

Reverse mortgage are available to any person over the age of 62 who has enough equity in their home. Instead of making monthly payments to the lender, the lender makes monthly payments to the borrower for as long as the borrower resides in the home (or it can be an up-front lump sum payment). The interest rate can be fixed or adjustable. When the

homeowner moves out or passes, the house is sold and the mortgage is paid off.

Home Equity Loans

A home equity loan is a loan for a fixed amount of money that is secured by a home. The borrower agrees to repay the loan with equal monthly payments over a fixed term, just like the original mortgage. If the borrower defaults on the payments, the lender can foreclose on the home. A homeowner must have equity in the home to get a home equity loan, thus the name. The equity is the appraised value of the home minus the amount still owed on the original mortgage. Usually, the maximum loan is for a certain percentage, say 90%, of the total value of the home minus the amount of the original mortgage.

Home Equity Lines of Credit

Like a home equity loan, a home equity line of credit — commonly known as a HELOC —requires the borrower to use his home as collateral for the loan. The HELOC, however, works much differently. It is a revolving line of credit, much like a credit card, against which the homeowner can borrow by writing a check or using a check card connected to the account.

The credit can be used as needed, however, the total amount that can be borrowed is set much like the Home Equity loan. Because a HELOC is a line of credit, the borrower makes payments only on the amount actually borrowed, not the full amount available, which can be an advantage for many people. Also, even after paying down a HELOC, the homeowner can re-borrow amounts up to the credit limit of the HELOC. Benchmark Community Bank tries to make the advice on its Financial Answer Center as useful and reliable as possible.

Information has been gleaned from a number of expert resources. However, the purpose of this advice section of the website is to provide customers and visitors with general guidance and useful tips only. It doesn't necessarily deal with every important topic or cover every aspect of the topics with which it deals and might not be relevant or appropriate in all circumstances. It is not designed to provide professional advice and should not be relied on as such. If in any doubt, you should consult an appropriately qualified expert for specific advice before acting on any of the information contained in the Answer Center.

Insurance in Islam Social Insurance

Insurance in Islam Social Insurance

Only risks involving heavy charges form objects of insurance, and these differ according to the times and social conditions, Among the Arabs at the commencement of Islam, daily ailments were unknown and the cost of medical care was practically nothing. The average man built his house with his own hands, and did not pay even for the major part of the material. Thus it is easy to understand why one had no need of insurance against sickness, fire etc. On the contrary, insurance against captivity and against assassination were a real need. Already in the time of the Prophet, this point had received attention, and certain dispositions were made which had the elasticity of further development and adaptation to circumstances. Thus, in the Constitution of the City-State of Medina of the first year of the Hijrah, this insurance is called ma'aqil and it worked in the following manner. If someone was made a prisoner of war by an enemy, payment of ransom was needed to procure his liberation. Similarly, all bodily torts or culpable homicides required payment of damages or blood money. This often exceeded the means of the individual concerned, prisoner or criminal. The Prophet organized an insurance on the basis of mutuality. The members of a tribe could count on the central treasury of their tribe, to which everybody contributed according to his means. And if the treasury of the tribe proved inadequate, other related or neighbouring tribes were under obligation to render aid. A hierarchy was established for organizing the units into a complete whole. At Medina, the tribes of the Ansarites were well known. The Prophet ordered the Meccan refugees there, who belonged originally to the various tribes of Mecca, or were Abyssinians, or Arabs belonging to different regions, to all constitute a new "tribe" of their own, for purposes of the said social insurance.

Later in the time of the caliph 'Umar, the branches of insurance were organized on the basis of the profession, civil or military administration, to which one belonged (or even of regions). Whenever needed, the central or provincial government came to the succour of the branches, as we have described above when speaking of State expenditure.

Insurance signifies essentially the repartition of the burden of an individual on as many as possible, in order to lighten the burden of each. Instead of the capitalistic companies of insurance, Islam preferred organising insurance on the basis of mutuality and cooperation, aided by a pyramidal gradation of the branches culminating in the central government.

Such a branch could engage in commerce with the help of unutilized funds remaining at its disposal, so that the capital is augmented. A time might come, when the members of a branch could be fully exempted from paying further contributions, or might even receive amounts of the profits of commerce. It goes without saying that these elements of mutual aid could insure against all kinds of risks, such as accident of traffic, fire, loss in transit, and so on. Also, it goes without saying that the insurance business is capable of being "nationalized" for all or certain kinds of risks (i.e. temporary motives such as the dispatch of parcels, etc.).

Without entering into technical details, it may be pointed out that capitalistic insurance, in which the insured person does not participate in the benefits of the company in proportion to his contributions, is not tolerated in Islam as this would constitute a form of game of chance.

In passing, we might mention another social institution of the time of the caliph 'Umar. He had organized a pension system for all the inhabitants of the country, and according to the Kitab al-Amwal of Ibn Zanjuwaih and ar-Risalahal-'Uthmaniyah of al-Jahiz, even non-Muslim subjects were among the beneficiaries of these pensions - so much so that as soon as a child was born, he began to receive a certain pension. The adults received the minimum necessary for living. In the beginning, the caliph practised a certain discrimination amongst the different categories of the pensioners, and if the minimum was one, the most favoured person received forty; yet towards the end of his life, he decided to observe complete equality, but he died before this reform could be introduced. This institution, named "Diwan," by 'Umar, seems to have originated in the very time of the Prophet, as the following report implies: "The basis of this practice is the narration that the Prophet named Mahmiyah ibn Jaz' to be in charge of the governmental fifth of the booty captured on the Banu'l-Mustaliq; and in fact Mahmiyah was in charge of the governmental fifth of all booties. The sadaqat (zakat taxes) were controlled separately and had their own particular administration. 

However, peaceful revenues from the enemy (fay') were administered by separate functionaries. The prophet used to spend the sadaqat on orphans, the weak and the poor. If the orphan reached puberty and military service (Jihad) became his duty, he was transferred from the list of the beneficiaries of the sadaqat to that of the fay'. If he refused to render military service, he would not benefit any more from the sadaqat and was commanded to earn his livelihood himself." (cf. Sarakhsi. Sharh as-Siyar al-Kabir, ed. Munajjed. 1978).

Project management And Project Manager Responsibilities

Project management administers the arranging, sorting out and executing a project. A project is an endeavor in particular begins and end parameters intended to create a characterized result, for example, another PC framework. A project is unique in relation to continuous procedures, for example, an administration program or an advantage management program.

The project management design is relied upon to adequately and proficiently directs all parts of a project all the way, with the perfect objective of conveying the result on time and on a spending plan. A project design frequently starts with a project sanction, and it is required to distinguish potential difficulties ahead of time and handle any barriers as they emerge so as to keep the project on a plan.

Project Manager Responsibilities

Business pioneers perceive project management as a particular capacity inside the association and contract people particularly prepared in this teach - i.e., project supervisors - to deal with their association's project management needs.

Project supervisors can utilize different strategies and ways to deal with run projects, for the most part choosing the best approach in light of the idea of the project, hierarchical needs and culture, the attitudes of those taking a shot at the projects, and different components.

Dealing with a project includes different advances. Despite the fact that the wording for these means differs, they regularly include:

Defining project goals;

Outlining the steps needed to achieve those goals;

Identifying the resources required to accomplish those steps;

Determining the budget and time required for each of the steps, as well as the 

project as a whole;

Overseeing the actual implementation and execution of the work; and

Delivering the finished outcome.

As a major aspect of a solid project management design, project administrators execute controls to evaluate execution and advance against the setup timetable, spending plan, and destinations laid out in the project management design. This is frequently alluded to as the project scope.

Since projects regularly require groups of specialists who don't normally cooperate, viable project management requires solid correspondence and transaction aptitudes. Project chiefs additionally need to work intimately with the numerous partners who have interests in any given project, another zone where solid correspondence and transaction aptitudes are fundamental.

ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHTS

uAl-Ghazali

Introduction:

Abu Hamid Mhammad bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad, surnamed al-Imam-ul-Jalilm, Hujjat-ul-Islam and Zainuddin, was born at Ghazzalah near Tus in 1058. He is one of the greatest and distinguished original philosophers not only in the history of Muslim philosophy but also in the history of human thought. He was educated at Tus proper in the early years of his career and later on he shifted to Jurjan, and then finally migrated to Nishapur to imbibe wisdom and philosophy by sitting at the feet of perhaps the most versatile genius of his time, Abul-Maali Muhammad al-Juwaini Imam-ul-Haramain, who was invited back from Hijaz to preside over one of the great colleges founded by Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi. He was accepted first as the pupil and the assistant by the Imam. Al-Ghazali won great fame and prominence because his philosophical doctrines and consequently as a great sage of the age, he was called to the court of Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi while still in his twenties. He was the intellectual adviser and chief canonist till 1091 when he was formally appointed to the great foundation of Baghdad.

Al-Ghazali was aptly considered a mujaddid and reckoned at par with the four Imams. There have been many philosophers and scholars in Islam and other religions, but the distinct caliber of one of great philosophers ushered a unique era of knowledge of his age. He left behind indelible impressions because of his immortal works and philosophical-cum-political doctrines which have still influence upon this modern age. In 1095, he had discontinued his work of teaching in Baghdad. His mind continually in a state of doubt, probably found no satisfaction in dogmatic predictions. Sherwani said, “Baghdad did not see very much of Ghazali and it seems that deep thought, coupled with murder of his patron Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi and the death of Malik Shah in 1092, all these things had a tremendous effect on his psychology.”

For about ten years, in the period of utter disillusionment, Al-Ghazali extensively traveled here and there to imbibe wisdom and intellect from every source, dividing his time between pious exercises and literary work. Al-Ghazali remained in fretful years because of state politics which took a serious turn. He died in Tus on 19th of December, 1111. His closing years were chiefly devoted to pious contemplation and the study of the Traditions, which as a youth he could never remember. A beautifully complete and rounded life in which the end comes back to the beginning.

Principle political works of Al-Ghazali are as follows:

1.       Munqidh Min ad-Dalal (Deliverance from Waywardness)

2.       Ihya-ul-Ulam (Renaissance of Sciences)

3.       Tibr-ul-Masbuk (Molten Gold)

4.       Sirr-ul-Alamain (The Mystery of the Two Worlds)

5.       Fatihat-ul-Ulum (Introduction to Sciences)

6.       Kimiya-i-Sa’adat (Alchemy of Goodness)

7.       Iqtisad Fil-I’tiqad (Moderation in Belief)

8.       Kitab-ul-Wajiz (a hand book of Fiqah, canon law)

Contribution of Al-Ghazali

to Islamic Political Thought

Al-Ghazali is undoubtedly an outstanding and remarkable political scholar in Islam. His philosophy is an expression of his own personality. He abandoned the attempt to understand this world. But the religious problem he comprehended much more profoundly than did the philosophers of his time. Dr. T. T. Debeer said, “These were intellectuals in their methods, like their Greek predecessors, and consequently regarded the doctrines of Religion as merely the products of the conception of fancy or even caprice of the law givers. According to them Religion was either blind obedience, or a kind of knowledge which contained truth of an inferior order. On the other hand, Al-Ghazali represents Religion as the experience of his inner being; it is for him more than Law and more than Doctrine, it is the Soul’s experience.”

Al-Ghazali’s philosophical analysis, logical positivism and religious empiricism have profoundly influenced every age of philosophy and religion and even today, modern student of the political history seeks inspiration in solving all philosophical and political inquiries. His liberalism and intellectualism completely dominated Western Philosophy and even Western thinkers preserved main elements of his great philosophy in their works. Europe, about the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth century of the Christian era, was in the abyss of degradation and political degeneration. This period is dubbed by one of the greatest of modern political scientists as “essentially unpolitical”.

In the contemporary age of Al-Ghazali, Europe was engulfed in perpetual controversy between Pope and the Emperor. This controversy led to political cleavage and intransigents and wreckers mutilated all traits of progress and prosperity. There was nothing but blood, destruction and wars, which snapped all resources and economy. Poverty and wrangling had become regular features of the day. At that time, East was at the pinnacle of glory and progress.

It is certainly difficult to agree with unfounded and sweeping statement of Hitti that Al-Ghazali constructed such a scholastic shell for Islam that all its future progress became arrested within it. If the progress of the West consisted as it is said in breaking a similar shell within context of his own religion then quite a few hammer strokes therein were wrought by the hands of the Muslim thinkers of which the uppermost hand was the hand of Al-Ghazali. This anybody might see for himself by making a close study of Al-Ghazali’s influence on the West.

Al-Ghazali as a great savant was decidedly superior to some of those who had gone before him. For while he had become conversant with the working of the political system when he was attending the court of his patron, Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi, Prime Minister of Suljuqi Kings, Al-Ghazali, while living in such surroundings had made a close study of the problems of politics. It was his efforts to leave off his luxurious life and write most of his works from a mental point of vantage in Syria or Arabia or else in the seclusion of his paternal hearth and home. Al-Ghazali is definitely superior to Al-Mawardi in being analytical as well as comparative in his arguments.

Sherwani was of the view that “A student of the history of political theories is aware of the great gap which seems to exist between the decline of Roman thought about the beginning of Christian era till about the thirteenth century, when thought seems dull, constitutions unscientific and people lethargic and pleasure-loving. Knowledge would be the richer and chains of thought more continuous if that artificial blank were to be filled by such giants of wisdom as Mawardi, Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi and Al-Ghazali. Even in oriental thought, Al-Ghazali’s place is certain. His greatness lies partly in having successfully refilled the desired outlined by brilliant Islamic colors, although they were not destined to last very long, giving place once again, and finally to barbaric hues.”

ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHTS

Ibn-e-Khaldoon 

 Introduction: 

Abu Zaid Abd-al-Rahman Ibn-e-Khaldoon, the North African Muslim of the 14th century, was undoubtedly the first to introduce a most scientific method in the political study of the history of human civilization. He is distinguished for considering history as a science worthy of study and not merely a narration of facts. Ibn-e-Khaldoon belonged to an Andalusian family which had migrated from Seville to Tunis on the expulsion of Moors on the conquest of Spain by Ferdinand III of Castile. It was one of these humble families that Ibn-e-Khaldoon was born in 1332, and he raised to be a man of remarkable knowledge as well as of profound historical and political acumen, perhaps the first scientific historian of world and one who has left an indelible mark on the sciences of historiography and sociology. During fourteenth century, Tunis was the cradle of learning and knowledge. Young Ibn-e-Khaldoon took full advantage of the scholastic opportunities which were abundantly available there. He learnt the Quran by heart, studied the Traditions and Maliki Jurisprudence, as well as Arabic Grammar and Rhetoric from eminent scholars and by dint of his sharp diligence and intellect, he was taken in service at the age of twenty by the ruler of Tunis, Abu Ishaq II. The restless spirit that was in him made him roam about from one capital to another, now secretary of state of Fez, then crossing the straits of Gibraltar as a fief holder of Muhammad bin Yousaf, Sultan of Granada, later as the head of a political mission to Pedro the Cruel, king of Castile who was staying at his ancestral town of Seville. Then he moved on to the court of the Prince of Bejaya near Constantine. In 1374, he again went to Granada but it was not long before he was expelled back to Africa. After returning Africa he was tired and weary of perennial wanderings and he took refuge in African Desert and compiled his world-famed Prolegomena giving finishing touches to it about the middle of 1377, after which he returned to his native town of Tunis a quarter of a century after he had left it. In 1382 he went to Cairo where he lived the rest of his life. At Egypt, he occupied a distinct position and high status as a Chief Justice a number of times and during the intervals, he used to deliver lectures. He died as judge in Cairo on March 17, 1406. He was reverently buried in Sufi Cemetery outside Cairo’s Nasr Gate. He was a versatile genius, a great philosopher and a man of strong convictions of his age, who wielded an abysmal influence on the posterity. Ibn-e-Khaldoon made great contributions in the field of knowledge and learning and his works are still widely read by every student of political philosophy. He gave us the following works: 1. Kitab-al-Ibrar…..It is a universal history written in seven volumes, the introduction to this work entitled Muqaddamah, extensive enough to take the whole of the first volume. It was about the author’s views with regard to the nature and method of history. 2. al-Taarif 3. History of the Berbers Contribution of Ibn-e-Khaldoon to Islamic Political Thought Ibn-e-Khaldoon wielded a deep influence on his succeeding political philosophers due to his systematic study of political theory in a dark age, when political discussion meant nothing more than a rough and ready formulation of the functions of the ruler. Almost all the eminent western philosophers like Machiavelli, Boding, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Hegel and Marx were profoundly influenced by his political theory composed in his immortal work “Muqaddamah” which extensively deals with a great variety of subjects. Ibn-e-Khaldoon was greatly reverenced as a sage of the age and his contemporaries envied him for his steadfastness and political acumen for combating political abuses and ills that prevailed in all ages of thoughts and philosophies. He left behind a treasure of knowledge which will work as a store-house for the posterities. Ibn-e-Khaldoon discussed various Islamic political institutions in the light of the history of the early Islamic state. He made political enquiries into the various historical events of the early period of Islam with impartiality and analytical mind of jurist. He upholds the practicability of Islamic laws in the state and considers the Sharia state as definitely superior to the Power state. He contemplates little of the Siyast Madaniya for he considers the philosophers ideal state as the visionary product of utopian thought, having no relation with historical facts. The ideal for him is the Islamic state as it existed under the first four Caliphs. But his empiricism is manifest in his analysis of the Muslim empires of his own day. In his political thinking, it is Islam that emerges as the sole objective for all human endeavors. Mohsin Mahdi says, “The biographical, stylistic and doctrinal evidence introduced in this study establish this point beyond any reasonable doubt. It has been shown that he articulately though cautiously, defended the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle against Neo-Platonism, atomism and logical nominalism; and that his study of Prophecy, the religious law and the character of the Islamic community prove that he was a true disciple of the Islamic Platonic tradition of political philosophy.” Ibn-e-Khaldoon seems to be the only great thinker who not only saw the problems of the relation of the history and the science of society to traditional political philosophy but also made full endeavors to develop a science of society with the framework of political philosophy as based on its principles. According to Ibn-e-Khaldoon, traditional philosophy demands the study of man and society as they really are, and supplies the frame work of directing such a study and utilizing its results. Rosenthal was of the view that importance of Ibn-e-Khaldoon was not recognized in his own time, and until the seventeenth century did Muslims writers take any notice of him, while Europeans scholars discovered him only in the last century. Ibn-e-Khaldoon’s importance consists in a number of novel insights of permanent value and significance: 1. In his distinction between rural and urban life and the necessity of the latter for the emergence of civilization and a state in the strict sense of the term. 2. In his postulating the Asabiya as the principal driving force of political action. 3. In his projection of Islam into a universal human civilization, thus standing on the social and in the climate of Islam and looking out towards humanity at large. 4. In his realization of the casual interdependence of the several factors of social life in the power state; economic, military, cultural and religious. 5. In the concept of the parallel existence of the state founded by a prophetic law-giver, as distinct from the state built on power in response to the human need for political association and the desire of strong personalities for domination. 6. Arising from the last point, in his definition and analysis of the Islamic country, as a composite structure whose law is a mixture of Shariah and political law. 7. In his basic recognition of the vital part which religion should play in the life of the state, especially if it transforms the Asabiya into a durable, cohesive and spiritual motive power.

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US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests BY ::: Shehzad H. Qazi

US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests 
BY ::: Shehzad H. Qazi

The last calendar year was by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. It began with CIA contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight in Lahore, then only worsened in May when Osama bin Laden was found and killed in a US raid at a compound near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad (an episode that severely angered Pakistanis and embarrassed the Army, which was domestically seen as unable to secure the homeland against foreign intrusion and internationally suspected of providing refuge to America’s worst enemy). Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani Network (HN), a Taliban group with safe havens in North Waziristan. Pakistan refused, and crisis hit when the HN launched a twenty-two hour assault on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. An infuriated Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Weeks of diplomatic efforts finally thawed relations, but just as the situation stabilized, a NATO attack on a Pakistani checkpoint in Salala in late November threw the relationship into a tailspin. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers died in the two-hour assault. Pakistan was furious, immediately suspending NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn conference on Afghanistan held in early December.
The crises of 2011 prompted debates in both countries over how to move forward. In Washington, several administration officials and members of Congress have argued for sidelining Pakistan and giving India a larger stake in Afghanistan. Others insist that it is important to tread carefully and that Pakistan cannot just be dumped. In Pakistan, many are arguing for complete disengagement while others are pushing for new rules of engagement. There are two fundamental problems undergirding US-Pakistan troubles. First, instead of a broad partnership that includes trade and cultural linkages, the two countries have a one-dimensional transactional relationship centered along security concerns, i.e., the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In a way, General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s retired Army chief and ambassador to the US, underscored this point, saying that, in his assessment, “US-Pakistan relations were at their worst because relations between the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army were unstable.” US-Pakistan relations are further complicated because of clashing security interests, especially vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban.
These two problems will not yield to quick diplomatic fixes. Barring a fundamental re-thinking, Washington and Islamabad should get used to making the best of an ambiguous alliance, and one that, going forward, will be limited, transactional, and security-centered, featuring competition over the endgame in Afghanistan, cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda, and a trimmed-down and conditional aid structure.
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The main source of US-Pakistan tensions has been the war in Afghanistan, and recent scuffles are linked to the shifting American strategy there. In 2009, the Obama administration set a goal of reversing the momentum of the Taliban by carrying out counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan. The main objective was not to defeat the Taliban, but to create a situation that could allow for a face-saving withdrawal. The 2009 troop surge was aimed at gaining control in major cities and roadways and imposing costs on the Taliban that would force them to the negotiating table. These objectives would be bolstered by the parallel Afghan-led national reconciliation program announced in January 2010, two months after the November surge. The US publicly supported the process and even established a special fund of $1.5 billion to provide monetary incentives to Taliban fighters.
However, Pakistan’s role was crucial in the success of this program. While NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) targeted the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan was supposed to launch an operation against the group’s bases in North Waziristan. It was to then follow this with political pressure that would force the Taliban to negotiate with the US and the Karzai government. Pakistan, whose security establishment has continued to provide refuge to the Afghan Taliban over the past decade, refused to comply. Leaders of all three major Taliban factions live in Pakistan, with a large part of the leadership of Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura having relocated to Karachi. According to a study published by the London School of Economics, ISI representatives sit in on the meetings and decisionmaking of the Taliban’s major councils. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has written that members of the Taliban even travel abroad on Pakistani passports.
That Pakistan would support a Taliban insurgency should be hardly surprising. First, Pakistan sees the Taliban as the group in Afghanistan that is the least averse to its interests and most capable of blocking increased influence by India, which Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment fears might pick up the pieces in Kabul following a US withdrawal. It is this strategic calculation, more than anything else, that has prevented Pakistan from cutting the Taliban loose, and it was disastrously naive for US policymakers to think that they could buy off such a deeply held security obsession for temporary offerings of $1.3 billion a year in aid. It is also true that deviousness in this situation has not been a Pakistani monopoly. While it has been insisting that Islamabad press on with attacks against the Taliban over the past year, the US has held secret meetings with Taliban representatives in Germany and Doha, Qatar—and kept Pakistan out of those talks. This only increased Pakistani insecurity and reinforced the idea that Washington will ignore its interests in the Afghan endgame.
The US goal in Afghanistan now is to reach a negotiated settlement that allows it to withdraw most forces, leaving a few thousand behind on bases in the north and west to protect the government in Kabul and carry out limited counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and other groups that threaten the government or US interests. A Time magazine blogger captured the new strategy poignantly, saying, “Counter-insurgency is so 2007. . . . All the cool kids are into counter-terrorism now.” Moreover, the US and Taliban are also moving toward more serious negotiations. Some initial confidence-building measures such as the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha and the release of Taliban prisoners from Guantánamo are being
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undertaken. Prospects of peace, however, cause disunity as much as prospects of war. Pakistan is already suspicious of the Qatar initiative because the US has kept it (and Afghanistan) out of the dialogue. It also won’t hesitate to exercise its influence over members of the Taliban leadership in exile. It has jailed several members of the group and is keeping others under house arrest and will undoubtedly seek several preconditions and concessions before it releases them to participate in the reconciliation.
It is also true that while negotiations shimmer, mirage-like, on the horizon, the Taliban has continued to systematically assassinate people in Karzai’s government to weaken the regime, and there is no guarantee that they will cease such attacks between now and 2014. Any future Taliban attack threatens to again raise the heat between America and Pakistan. Finally, the negotiations themselves will prove a tough endeavor. During the bargaining process, the United States’ rational goal will be to concede as little as possible in terms of power and control to the Taliban and other Pashtun groups being supported by Pakistan, while Pakistan’s goal will be to draw away as much power as possible from the US and its Afghan allies, who are mainly composed of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras and belong to the group formerly called the Northern Alliance. Moreover, Pakistan, like other countries in the region, would not want a long-term American military presence in Afghanistan and will also make that an issue that will continue to complicate the tug-of-war with the US over ultimate outcomes in Afghanistan. While the US seeks a political settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, its policy against al-Qaeda is to “disrupt, defeat, and dismantle” the organization and prevent its return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. The war against al-Qaeda is an area in which the US and Pakistan have cooperated in the past and will continue to cooperate in the future. Since 2002, Pakistan has been steadily attacking al-Qaeda in the tribal areas and arresting its operatives in Pakistani cities. Several members of al-Qaeda, including senior member Younis al-Mauritani, were arrested in Pakistan in 2011.
The war against al-Qaeda, however, raises the key issue of drone strikes. Since 2004, the CIA has been conducting a drone campaign inside Pakistan that has eliminated hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters and their local allies. Last year alone, at least three top al-Qaeda operatives, including military chief Ilyas Kashmiri, were killed through drone strikes.
The drone program has, however, been an issue of contention for two reasons. First, these strikes are unpopular with the Pakistani public because of the civilians who perish in the collateral damage. A 2011 Pew survey found that sixty-one percent of Pakistanis disagreed that missile strikes were necessary and eighty-nine percent said strikes kill too many civilians. A survey carried out within the tribal areas by the New America Foundation found that seventy-six percent opposed US missile strikes and forty-eight percent said they kill civilians rather than militants.
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While Pakistan’s official policy has been to condemn drone strikes, the military and the civilian government have supported them behind the scenes. In one cable released by WikiLeaks, Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani was quoted as saying, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, the powerful head of the Pakistani military, was reported to have even requested more drone support in South Waziristan. Moreover, these strikes have occurred with intelligence sharing between the ISI and CIA, with the human intelligence that is required to conduct the strikes coming from Pakistan. Finally, until recently, the drones often flew from Pakistan’s Shamsi Airfield. But a shift in policy has now taken place with the forced vacation of the Shamsi air base and the Pakistani Parliament’s recommendation that “no unauthorized incursions into Pakistan’s airspace” occur. Based on Pakistan’s new policy, drones can no longer fly out of Pakistani bases and Pakistan itself should have an increased role in the decisionmaking over the strikes. According to Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, “due to the indiscriminate and hugely counterproductive attacks of recent years, Pakistan wants to limit their number and also be informed of the strikes and the targets prior to their occurrence.”
Despite these shifts, however, the drone program will continue to be an area of cooperation between the two countries. This point was clearly illustrated through the two strikes that took place on January 10th and 12th of this year. The strikes killed Aslam Awan, a senior al-Qaeda aide, and also allegedly targeted Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the Movement of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), an al-Qaeda allied group. Several more strikes have taken place since, and despite tensions over the Salala incident no sustained opposition has been voiced from Pakistani officials, evidencing continued cooperation in the drone program and the fight against al-Qaeda.
US aid to Pakistan, a third major issue between the two counties, has become contentious as relations have deteriorated and American policymakers and elected officials have often charged that Pakistan has been given more than $20 billion in recent years in effect to bite the hand that was feeding it. But this is an issue, from Islamabad’s point of view anyhow, that is not as simple as it appears. First, in terms of the breakdown of US financial transfers to Pakistan, based on figures compiled by the Congressional Research Service, from 2002 to 2011 Pakistan is supposed to have received approximately $5.7 billion in security aid, $7.47 billion in economic aid, and $8.9 billion in Coalition Support Fund transfers. Thus, out of $22 billion, US aid to Pakistan has totaled approximately $13.2 billion in ten years. The remaining $8.9 billion, or forty percent of the total, has actually been reimbursements to Pakistan for the costs it has incurred in fighting al-Qaeda and its allies, and not aid.
Second, aid disbursement has been chaotic. Many times payments have been delayed, millions have often remained stuck in the pipeline, such as money from the Kerry-Lugar bill, and Pakistan has been owed money from previous fiscal years.
Finally, US aid has not made enough of an impact on Pakistani civilians to provoke any significant gratitude. Most do not see the benefit of civilian aid, much of which goes to foreign contractors, or is distributed by the government to its cronies and supporters. Moreover, some
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Pakistanis see US aid as a way to force Pakistan to fight America’s wars. In the absence of tangible benefits and in the face of war wariness, many average Pakistanis are now said to favor the end of American aid so Washington loses the power to compel Pakistan to agree with its objectives. In the aftermath of the bin Laden raid, and because of congressional desire to cut expenditures, the US-Pakistan aid relationship has changed in the last year. For example, $700 million of military aid was frozen in July 2011, when Pakistan expelled American military trainers. Congress has also made economic and security aid conditional upon Pakistan fighting militants. Although the Obama administration was influential in tripling non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar bill, experts are predicting a future shrinking of economic assistance as well. Currently there is a bill in the House of Representatives titled the Pakistan Accountability Act, which seeks to cut all aid to Pakistan, except for money for the protection of nuclear weapons. The bill has yet to be voted on, but it foreshadows where the aid relationship is headed. It is quite possible that, over the next few years, US aid to Pakistan will become minimal, except for funds for protection of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan is often described in Washington as “double-dealing” and “duplicitous.” Pakistani analysts describe their country’s relationship with the US to me as “unequal” and “humiliating.” Najam Rafique, a US expert at the Institute of Strategic Studies, in Islamabad, said, “Pakistan has been treated with contempt by the US; it’s been mistreated and ordered around.” Sadly enough, both characterizations are accurate. After 9/11, the US essentially coerced Pakistan to join the Global War on Terror and, since then, often forced it to act against its own perceived interests. Pakistan, on the other hand, accepted Washington’s monetary incentives but undermined the US effort by providing safe havens to its enemies.
The lack of a broad partnership between America and Pakistan prevented the building of mutual trust or the alignment of interests. Instead, the two countries settled for a one-dimensional, transactional relationship centered along security concerns. What was missing was a synchronicity between the two countries’ security calculus for the “AfPak” region. Nor is there much evidence that this state of affairs will change, a point painfully obvious to foreign affairs experts in the US and Pakistan alike. Bruce O. Riedel, a former CIA officer who authored the Obama administration’s 2009 policy review for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was recently quoted in the New York Times Magazine as saying, “I can see how this gets worse . . . And I can see how this gets catastrophically worse. . . . I don’t see how it gets a whole lot better.” Similarly, Zafar Hilaly, a retired Pakistani diplomat, recently said to me, “This relationship is not headed anywhere—our ways part, our paths are divergent.”
While disengagement is not an option—the continuation of relations today despite the horrors of 2011 illustrates this point—limited collaboration is the best that can be expected. Even as both countries cooperate to eliminate al-Qaeda, their positions in the Afghan endgame will be competitive. Pakistan will seek concessions before it allows the Afghan Taliban to fully participate in negotiations. Moreover, it will seek greater influence for its allies in a future Afghan government, while the US will push to secure the power of its Afghan allies. Finally, military and economic aid to Pakistan will be conditional and results-oriented.
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It is important to point out that although such a relationship can accomplish short-term objectives, it cannot tackle mid-to-long-term challenges. That is why there is a crucial need for Washington to vigorously rethink relations with Pakistan. US regional interests and Pakistan’s geopolitical importance warrant a pragmatic, complex, and dynamic Pakistan policy. The US plans to maintain sizable bases and a military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. It also has interests in Central Asia because of the region’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas. On the other hand, Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state led by corrupt and unaccountable leaders and institutions, with a weak economy, growing population, and a youth bulge. Moreover, it suffers from resource scarcity and mismanagement (especially in water, gas, and electricity) and will need resources to provide postconflict stability in many parts of the country. In the long run, the US can scarcely afford a minimalist relationship with Pakistan. It must engage Pakistan on multiple dimensions and create partnerships to encompass the government, business, and financial sector and civil society. The alternative to such a creative rethinking is not pleasant to contemplate.
Shehzad H. Qazi is a research associate at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.

U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran

The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Middle East Institute,

The Middle East Policy Council, and The Stanley Foundation

U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf:

Iran

This policy brief is based on the discussion at the third in a jointly sponsored series of congressional staff

briefings on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf.” To receive information on future briefings,

contact Elaine Schilling, at eschilling@stanleyfoundation.org.

While the United States has, since 1979, pursued a policy of containment vis-à-vis Iran, it has found it all

but impossible to ignore a fuel-rich and regionally influential nation of some 65 million people.

In the wake of September 11th, however, it appeared that a new chapter might be opened in the longrunning

U.S.-Iranian stalemate. The destruction of Taliban rule in Afghanistan was a common goal of the

two countries and led to an unprecedented Iranian pledge to help rescue U.S. airmen downed over Iranian

territory. Iran played a constructive role in the formation of Afghanistan’s interim government and stood

ready to aid Afghan refugees. Just a few months later, however, the Bush administration accused Iran of

working to destabilize the fragile Afghan state and placed Iran along side Iraq and North Korea in an

“axis of evil.”

To understand the contradictions and vicissitudes of U.S.-Iranian relations, one must first explore the

Iranian policies considered “evil” by successive U.S. administrations. Next, one must endeavor to

comprehend the motivations behind these policies. Last, it is important to look at both the opportunities

for and challenges to a significant improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.

1. Key Issues

The main sources of friction in U.S.-Iranian relations can be broken down into three categories,

roughly in order of importance:

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: This issue is arguably the most important one

in U.S.-Iranian relations. Since the early 1980s, Iran has militarily, economically and

politically supported Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), three of many

groups considered terrorist by the United States for their violent anti-Israel operations.

Iranians have called for the destruction of the Israeli state and have recently been identified as

behind the intercepted Karine-A arms shipment to the Palestinians. U.S. officials worry that

Iran-backed Hezbollah forces might open a second front against Israel in northern Galilee if

the Palestinian situation continues to deteriorate.

B. Weapons Proliferation: The United States worries that Iran is developing advanced nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems. In fact, since the beginning of

the first Clinton administration, the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain have

The Atlantic Council of the United States, www.acus.org • The Middle East Institute, www.TheMiddleEastInstitute.org

The Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org • The Stanley Foundation, www.emergingfromconflict.org/iran

believed Iran to be on the cusp of violating its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations

(NPT), though they acknowledge that it has not yet done so. The United States reasons that,

because Iran enjoys plentiful deposits of oil and gas, its pursuit of nuclear power (allowed

under the NPT and being carried out most notably at Bushehr by Russian experts) is tantamount

to Iran creating a nuclear option – gathering expertise from civil nuclear projects that might be

used for military ends. Iran’s growing weapons capabilities could conceivably be used against

Israel or against U.S. forces in the Gulf.

C. Regional Hegemony: It is not the interest of the United States to allow any hostile country to

dominate the Gulf and/or access to the Gulf’s energy supplies. Iran is strategically placed to

do this. It is not, however, in Iran’s national interest to restrict its exportation of oil or gas

resources and Iran has steadily improved relations with most of its Gulf neighbors.

2. The Iranian Context

Iran’s actions, which sometimes seem inconsistent, are partially determined by internal power

struggles between the country’s conservative and reformist forces. While the former claim to

represent the will of God and hold the reigns of power, the latter represent the will of the people and

enjoy the legitimacy of having been popularly elected. It is important to note, however, that the two

camps often agree on foreign policy goals, though they may not advocate the same tactics for

achieving those goals.

There are several explanations behind the behaviors that the United States and many of its allies

consider troublesome.

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: Both Iranian conservatives and reformists

oppose Israel, though reformist President Khatami might well not know the true extent to

which Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Revolutionary Guards, Intelligence Service or other

independent groups in Iran collaborate with Hezbollah militants. Nonetheless, both camps

within Iran view Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as groups of freedom

fighters, struggling against Israeli occupation and oppression. Iranians therefore argue that

their support of the Palestinians and Lebanese against “terrorist” Israel is justified. This

Iranian sentiment is unlikely to change without a major change in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict or a shift of opinion in the rest of the Middle East.

B. Weapons Proliferation: The Iranians are quick to point out that they have not formally violated

any of their treaty obligations concerning nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and

missiles. At the same time, both conservatives and reformists defend Iran’s missile programs

as necessary to protect them from a myriad of potential and actual enemies. To Iran’s west lies

Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s regime carried on an 8-year war with Iran, during which the Iraqi

dictator used chemical weapons and launched large-scale missile attacks on Iranian cities. To

Iran’s east are Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are both heavily armed and unstable countries.

Iranians view the U.S. troops in the Gulf as an additional serious threat to their security and

they believe that a rough nuclear balance should exist between Israel and the Muslim states of

the Middle East. As long as Iran feels threatened by any or all of these countries, it is unlikely

to voluntarily abandon its weapons programs.

The Atlantic Council of the United States, www.acus.org • The Middle East Institute, www.TheMiddleEastInstitute.org

The Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org • The Stanley Foundation, www.emergingfromconflict.org/iran

C. Regional Hegemony: Iran is seeking to break out of U.S. encirclement. Were the United States

to launch new operations against Iraq as part of its war on terrorism, it would have troops on

all of Iran’s borders. This scenario is viewed as a dangerous possibility by all Iranians,

although the reformist camp is amenable to limited cooperation with the United States in

conjunction with the war on terrorism. The conservative camp is opposed to such cooperation.

3. The Road Ahead

Both the United States and Iran harbor bad memories of each other. Americans recall the Iran

Hostage Crisis of 1979 and Iranians remember the Mossadeq affair of the early 1950s as well as U.S.

support for the Shah in the 1970s. Moving beyond the current stalemate will require that both sides

agree to live with these difficult memories.

In addition to unresolved historical grievances, the U.S.-Iranian stalemate is perpetuated by the

absence of direct government-to-government contact between the two adversaries. Iranians claim that

they cannot engage in dialogue as long as coercive economic sanctions are in place. At the same time,

the United States will not lift sanctions until the Iranians correct the troublesome behaviors outlined

above. A possible way out of this dilemma would be for the United States to pursue its many areas of

common interest with Iran, especially those in Afghanistan. Iran was key to the creation of

Afghanistan’s interim government, and showed its willingness to work toward common goals with the

anti-terror coalition in Bonn and in Tokyo. Afghanistan thus represents a new opportunity for U.S.-

Iranian coordination.

This new opportunity contrasts with the deadlock apparent in the three major problem areas noted

throughout this brief. Of those, improvement in Iran’s stance vis-à-vis Israel would be the most

important for fostering an overall improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: It is highly unlikely that powerful

organizations in Iran will soon drop their support for violent anti-Israel groups. Nevertheless,

the Palestinian issue is not a high priority for most Iranians. Much will depend on how

successful the recently proposed Saudi peace plan is in getting negotiations back on track.

B. Weapons Proliferation: While technically abiding by its treaty obligations, Iran’s disclosures

regarding its various weapons programs leave a lot to be desired. The United States acting

alone, however, cannot prevent Iran from acquiring proscribed weapons. This suggests the

need for improving multilateral verification regimes.

C. Regional Hegemony: It is unrealistic to expect that Iran will play no role in structuring security

arrangements for its neighbor, Afghanistan, or a post-Saddam Iraq. Given this, the United

States should focus on constructive roles for Iran in regional security. In particular, it should

seize every opportunity to coordinate with the Iranians on building more stable and durable

security in the Gulf.