U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran

The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Middle East Institute,

The Middle East Policy Council, and The Stanley Foundation

U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf:

Iran

This policy brief is based on the discussion at the third in a jointly sponsored series of congressional staff

briefings on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf.” To receive information on future briefings,

contact Elaine Schilling, at eschilling@stanleyfoundation.org.

While the United States has, since 1979, pursued a policy of containment vis-à-vis Iran, it has found it all

but impossible to ignore a fuel-rich and regionally influential nation of some 65 million people.

In the wake of September 11th, however, it appeared that a new chapter might be opened in the longrunning

U.S.-Iranian stalemate. The destruction of Taliban rule in Afghanistan was a common goal of the

two countries and led to an unprecedented Iranian pledge to help rescue U.S. airmen downed over Iranian

territory. Iran played a constructive role in the formation of Afghanistan’s interim government and stood

ready to aid Afghan refugees. Just a few months later, however, the Bush administration accused Iran of

working to destabilize the fragile Afghan state and placed Iran along side Iraq and North Korea in an

“axis of evil.”

To understand the contradictions and vicissitudes of U.S.-Iranian relations, one must first explore the

Iranian policies considered “evil” by successive U.S. administrations. Next, one must endeavor to

comprehend the motivations behind these policies. Last, it is important to look at both the opportunities

for and challenges to a significant improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.

1. Key Issues

The main sources of friction in U.S.-Iranian relations can be broken down into three categories,

roughly in order of importance:

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: This issue is arguably the most important one

in U.S.-Iranian relations. Since the early 1980s, Iran has militarily, economically and

politically supported Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), three of many

groups considered terrorist by the United States for their violent anti-Israel operations.

Iranians have called for the destruction of the Israeli state and have recently been identified as

behind the intercepted Karine-A arms shipment to the Palestinians. U.S. officials worry that

Iran-backed Hezbollah forces might open a second front against Israel in northern Galilee if

the Palestinian situation continues to deteriorate.

B. Weapons Proliferation: The United States worries that Iran is developing advanced nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems. In fact, since the beginning of

the first Clinton administration, the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain have

The Atlantic Council of the United States, www.acus.org • The Middle East Institute, www.TheMiddleEastInstitute.org

The Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org • The Stanley Foundation, www.emergingfromconflict.org/iran

believed Iran to be on the cusp of violating its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations

(NPT), though they acknowledge that it has not yet done so. The United States reasons that,

because Iran enjoys plentiful deposits of oil and gas, its pursuit of nuclear power (allowed

under the NPT and being carried out most notably at Bushehr by Russian experts) is tantamount

to Iran creating a nuclear option – gathering expertise from civil nuclear projects that might be

used for military ends. Iran’s growing weapons capabilities could conceivably be used against

Israel or against U.S. forces in the Gulf.

C. Regional Hegemony: It is not the interest of the United States to allow any hostile country to

dominate the Gulf and/or access to the Gulf’s energy supplies. Iran is strategically placed to

do this. It is not, however, in Iran’s national interest to restrict its exportation of oil or gas

resources and Iran has steadily improved relations with most of its Gulf neighbors.

2. The Iranian Context

Iran’s actions, which sometimes seem inconsistent, are partially determined by internal power

struggles between the country’s conservative and reformist forces. While the former claim to

represent the will of God and hold the reigns of power, the latter represent the will of the people and

enjoy the legitimacy of having been popularly elected. It is important to note, however, that the two

camps often agree on foreign policy goals, though they may not advocate the same tactics for

achieving those goals.

There are several explanations behind the behaviors that the United States and many of its allies

consider troublesome.

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: Both Iranian conservatives and reformists

oppose Israel, though reformist President Khatami might well not know the true extent to

which Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Revolutionary Guards, Intelligence Service or other

independent groups in Iran collaborate with Hezbollah militants. Nonetheless, both camps

within Iran view Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as groups of freedom

fighters, struggling against Israeli occupation and oppression. Iranians therefore argue that

their support of the Palestinians and Lebanese against “terrorist” Israel is justified. This

Iranian sentiment is unlikely to change without a major change in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict or a shift of opinion in the rest of the Middle East.

B. Weapons Proliferation: The Iranians are quick to point out that they have not formally violated

any of their treaty obligations concerning nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and

missiles. At the same time, both conservatives and reformists defend Iran’s missile programs

as necessary to protect them from a myriad of potential and actual enemies. To Iran’s west lies

Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s regime carried on an 8-year war with Iran, during which the Iraqi

dictator used chemical weapons and launched large-scale missile attacks on Iranian cities. To

Iran’s east are Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are both heavily armed and unstable countries.

Iranians view the U.S. troops in the Gulf as an additional serious threat to their security and

they believe that a rough nuclear balance should exist between Israel and the Muslim states of

the Middle East. As long as Iran feels threatened by any or all of these countries, it is unlikely

to voluntarily abandon its weapons programs.

The Atlantic Council of the United States, www.acus.org • The Middle East Institute, www.TheMiddleEastInstitute.org

The Middle East Policy Council, www.mepc.org • The Stanley Foundation, www.emergingfromconflict.org/iran

C. Regional Hegemony: Iran is seeking to break out of U.S. encirclement. Were the United States

to launch new operations against Iraq as part of its war on terrorism, it would have troops on

all of Iran’s borders. This scenario is viewed as a dangerous possibility by all Iranians,

although the reformist camp is amenable to limited cooperation with the United States in

conjunction with the war on terrorism. The conservative camp is opposed to such cooperation.

3. The Road Ahead

Both the United States and Iran harbor bad memories of each other. Americans recall the Iran

Hostage Crisis of 1979 and Iranians remember the Mossadeq affair of the early 1950s as well as U.S.

support for the Shah in the 1970s. Moving beyond the current stalemate will require that both sides

agree to live with these difficult memories.

In addition to unresolved historical grievances, the U.S.-Iranian stalemate is perpetuated by the

absence of direct government-to-government contact between the two adversaries. Iranians claim that

they cannot engage in dialogue as long as coercive economic sanctions are in place. At the same time,

the United States will not lift sanctions until the Iranians correct the troublesome behaviors outlined

above. A possible way out of this dilemma would be for the United States to pursue its many areas of

common interest with Iran, especially those in Afghanistan. Iran was key to the creation of

Afghanistan’s interim government, and showed its willingness to work toward common goals with the

anti-terror coalition in Bonn and in Tokyo. Afghanistan thus represents a new opportunity for U.S.-

Iranian coordination.

This new opportunity contrasts with the deadlock apparent in the three major problem areas noted

throughout this brief. Of those, improvement in Iran’s stance vis-à-vis Israel would be the most

important for fostering an overall improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.

A. Iranian Support of Violent Opposition to Israel: It is highly unlikely that powerful

organizations in Iran will soon drop their support for violent anti-Israel groups. Nevertheless,

the Palestinian issue is not a high priority for most Iranians. Much will depend on how

successful the recently proposed Saudi peace plan is in getting negotiations back on track.

B. Weapons Proliferation: While technically abiding by its treaty obligations, Iran’s disclosures

regarding its various weapons programs leave a lot to be desired. The United States acting

alone, however, cannot prevent Iran from acquiring proscribed weapons. This suggests the

need for improving multilateral verification regimes.

C. Regional Hegemony: It is unrealistic to expect that Iran will play no role in structuring security

arrangements for its neighbor, Afghanistan, or a post-Saddam Iraq. Given this, the United

States should focus on constructive roles for Iran in regional security. In particular, it should

seize every opportunity to coordinate with the Iranians on building more stable and durable

security in the Gulf.